Introduction
The recent literature that analyzes the e ect of takeovers on stakeholders has focused primarily on moral hazard issues, with a particular emphasis on the ideas that takeover threats create value by disciplining managers and workers, and that they can reduce value by leading managers to act myopically and by restricting the possibilities to enter into implicit contracts with stakeholders.
1
The formal analysis of all these e ects on stakeholders within the rm suggests that these e ects share many similarities with those on stakeholders outside the rm, and particularly on the rm's trading partners. However, it is not clear that moral hazard is an important problem in a number of business relationships, e.g. a seller-buyer relationship. Even when moral hazard creates substantial problems, these problems may be a ected by other problems such as asymmetric information. Can takeover threats have real e ects in the absence of moral hazard? In this paper, we address the e ect of takeover threats on asymmetric information problems. We point out that being a (either shortterm or long-term) takeover target a ects the informational ows and the terms of trade in a long-term relationship.
In our setup, we rule out any moral hazard issues. We assume instead that the only issue is asymmetric information between the rm and its stakeholders. Speci cally, in the presence of a takeover threat, (i) privately known parameters of stakeholders are modi ed, and (ii) the possibility for the rm to extract rents may be altered. Hence, takeovers and takeover threats a ect the incentives of stakeholders to reveal information as well as the amount of rents that can be captured from them. This allows us to derive empirical pre-dictions on the e ects of takeover threats (that do not convey any particular information) on pricing strategies and on information ows within and across rms by considering a long-term relationship between an uninformed rm that is a potential takeover target and a privately informed one.
2
Formally speaking, such relationships are characterized by issues that can be captured in terms of dynamic adverse selection problems. In particular, in the case of a non durable good, these relationships lead to the celebrated ratchet e ect: The actions taken at the beginning of the relationship reveal information that the previously uninformed party will use in subsequent contract o ers to increase his pro t at the expense of the informed party. Hence, the informed party may be reluctant to reveal this information early if the uninformed party does not induce him to do so credibly, which is often costly to her. Inducing information revelation thus requires that contract o ers by the uninformed party be subject to the constraint that the informational rent when information is not revealed is lower than the payo to the informed party if he chooses not to reveal his type. For instance, a worker may refuse to reveal a high productivity because he expects that this would lead the manager to ask for more demanding performance requirements in the future. A buyer facing several consecutive buying decisions is reluctant to pay a high price at the beginning of the relationship as he expects that the seller, after learning that the buyer is willing to buy the good at a high price, will subsequently choose a higher price. In both cases, the pro t to the rm is reduced because of the informed party's long term strategy.
2 Asymmetric information may also be regarded as a proxy for rent extraction in, say, the problem of a dynamic monopoly that tries to extract rents from buyers distributed on a traditional downward-sloping demand curve. From this viewpoint, the possibility of a takeover that is expected to a ect pricing strategies will a ect the rm's ability to engage in price discrimination. This paper investigates how these problems are a ected by the possibility of a takeover. The takeover a ects the relationship between an initially uninformed rm and a privately informed buyer in two ways. On the one hand, the bidder creates value by increasing the buyer's valuation. On the other hand, it can increase the fraction of the surplus that the rm will obtain, and decrease the fraction of the surplus that will be left to the buyer. These two e ects are meant to capture and to combine two ingredients that are central to the literature on the real e ects of takeovers: Value creation and wealth transfer at the expense of stakeholders. The higher valuation increases the surplus that goes to the buyer, which increases his incentive to disclose information to the rm. This enables the rm to charge a higher separating price in the rst period. On the other hand, high bargaining power allows the rm to appropriate a higher share of the surplus and increases the bene t from the information revealed by the buyer in subsequent periods. Since information revelation is more harmful to the buyer, the rm must cut the price o ered to the buyer in order to induce him to reveal his information. This price can become so low that the rm is better o not inducing the buyer to reveal his information with certainty. Overall, takeovers that create signi cant value favor information disclosure, while wealth-transferring takeovers make information disclosure more costly.
Existing contributions on takeovers that involve asymmetric information generally consider asymmetric information between the target rm's management and the bidder and/or shareholders (Hirshleifer, 1996) . Most of them focus on information revelation via the takeover and its characteristics (see, e.g., Fishman, 1989 , Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990 , Brown and Ryngaert, 1991 , and Nagarajan, 1995 . In our setup, the asymmetry of information is between the target rm and its stakeholders, rather than between the target rm and the bidder.
Our results are consistent with empirical papers that document that takeovers lead targets to increase output prices following an increase in market power (Kim and Singal, 1993) or in leverage (Chevalier, 1995 , Phillips, 1995 . However, these empirical papers (1) do not distinguish between the change in capital structure and the change of corporate control; (2) they examine the e ect of takeovers on product market prices by focusing on competitors; and (2) they are mostly silent on the e ects of takeover threats. In this paper, we investigate the e ect of takeover threats on the dynamics of pricing strategies when there is no change in capital structure.
3 We further discuss a number of other empirical predictions on the real e ects of takeover threats, managerial turnover, pricing strategies, and trade credit.
Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 rst presents the impact of rent sharing on information disclosure and on the terms of trade. Section 4 analyzes how takeovers that can both create value and transfer wealth from the buyer to the bidder a ect information ows and transaction prices. Section 5 examines alternative interpretations for some assumptions in our model. Section 6 discusses applications to, and empirical predictions on, the performance of takeover targets, pricing decisions, and trade credit. Section 7 concludes.
3 In analyzing the e ect of nancial transactions on information revelation in dynamic adverse selection problems, this work is in line with Chemla and Faure-Grimaud (2001) who show how a high debt level enabled a non informed party to induce a privately informed one (with whom it is engaged in a long-term relationship) to reveal it at a lower cost. Due to the possibility of liquidation associated to a high debt level (even when renegotiation is allowed), the informed party is led to reduce the attention it pays to the future informational rents from refusing to reveal information today.
The Model

The Product Market
A rm F can produce and sell one unit of a non durable good to a buyer in both periods 1 and 2. The buyer has private information about his valuation v that can take values V L or V H , with V H > V L > 0, under the incumbent manager I. Initially, it is common knowledge that v = V H with probability 1 .
The production cost is 0. As in standard adverse selection problems (e.g. Maskin and Riley, 1984) , we assume that the rm is better o selling the good at price V H with probability 1 than selling it at price V L with probability 1,
For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to short term contracts unless otherwise speci ed. 4 The discount factor is denoted .
The Takeover
For simplicity, the incumbent manager is assumed to maximise shareholder value. After the stage 1 product market decisions, the relationship between the rm and the buyer can be a ected by a takeover that has the following characteristics:
The stage 2 buyer's valuation under the bidder, B, is bv, where b > 1.
In other words, the buyer's valuation for the good is higher under B's management than under I's management, and the bidder's valuation for the rm is higher than I's.
The takeover a ects the way the surplus is shared between the rm and the buyer. Speci cally, if a stage 2 product-market transaction takes place, the buyer gets a fraction 1 I of the surplus under the incumbent manager, and a fraction 1 B 6 = 1 I if the takeover took place.
Fractions I ; B are common knowledge.
In order to takeover the rm, B must incur a xed cost C > 0 in addition to the price he pays to the incumbent owner(s).
One possible interpretation behind these probabilities is that the takeover a ects the following simple bargaining game. With probability d ; d 2 fI; Bg, called the manager's bargaining power, the manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the buyer. With probability 1 d , the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the manager. The reasons why the bidder may have higher bargaining power may include a higher concentration in ownership structure and a more rigorous management (see Habib, 1997, and Jarrell et al, 1988) after the takeover. A higher ownership concentration is likely to increase the rm's bargaining power, since a larger shareholder bene ts more from a favorable bargaining outcome and is, therefore, prepared to allocate more resources to negotiation. Alternatively, a takeover may increase market power, whether it is a horizontal merger (see, e.g. Kim and Singal, 1993) or a vertical merger (Rey and Tirole, 2002, and Chemla, 2003b) , and hence make the buyer's outside options less attractive. On the other hand, the bidder may be less informed about some speci cities of the target rm, which is likely to leave the buyer with more rents. 5 Section 5.1 argues that this assumption that the buyer ap-
propriates di erent fractions of the surplus under the incumbent manager and under the bidder can also be interpreted as di erences in stochastic valuations or in abilities to write a full-commitment long term contract. Note that our speci cation is convenient as it applies directly to the impact of takeovers on both pricing strategies and industrial relations.
In this model, we rule out any ine ciency in the takeover bid. Hence, the nature of the merger bid does not a ect the analysis, as it does not a ect the probability of success of the takeover. Speci cally, the price at which I sells his shares to B does not a ect the analysis. Empirical evidence suggests that the surplus usually goes to the shareholders of the target rm (Jarrell et al, 1988) , which is consistent with the assumption that the incumbent manager has all bargaining power vis-a-vis the bidder. One reason for this is that, during the takeover of a publicly listed rm with dispersed ownership, free-riding target shareholders may appropriate all the surplus created by the takeover (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . 
Timing, Equilibrium, and Objectives
The timing can be summarized as follows:
In period 1, the manager and the buyer bargain over a price corresponding to the sale of one unit of the good. If both parties agree, the transaction takes place according to the terms of the agreement. Otherwise, both parties get 0. Then, the bidder decides whether or not to take over the rm.
In period 2, the manager and the buyer bargain over a new price. If no agreement is found, both parties get 0. Otherwise, the production and sale take place according to the terms of the agreement.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is characterized by i) a sequence of prices fp 1 ; p 2 g o ered by the manager and prices fw 1 ; w 2 g o ered by the buyer. A sequence of decisions by the buyer and the manager, respectively, to accept these o ers or not. We denote by x i t (p t ) the probability that the buyer of type i 2 fl; hg accepts an o er p t (t = 1; 2); ii) a probability distribution de ning the manager's beliefs about the buyer's valuation that is consistent with equilibrium strategies and that uses the Bayes' rule. These beliefs are represented by 1 in period 1 and by 2 (I) in period 2, where I is the information obtained at the end of period 1, i.e. either w 1 , or x 1 = 0 (rejection of an o er p 1 ), or
e. p 1 is accepted); and iii) a decision by the incumbent manager to o er a price for a takeover and a decision for the bidder to accept it or not.
When the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave it o er, he o ers w 1 = w 2 = 0, i.e. the rm's reservation price, and the rm obtains no rent. Hence, the buyer's objective function boils down to
The incumbent manager's objective can be written
where z is the transfer from the bidder to the rm's incumbent owner(s), if there is a takeover. Finally, the bidder's objective is maxf z C + B x i 2 (p 2 )t 2 ; 0g..
The E ect of Rent Sharing on Prices and The Dynamics of Information Flows
We rst analyze the impact of bargaining on the buyer's decision to reveal information and on the rm's pricing strategy. We proceed by backward induction.
When the rm makes a period 2 o er, the buyer of type i 2 fl; hg accepts any o er p 2 v i and turns down any other o er. Hence, the rm o ers by not mimicking a low valuation buyer. The latter rents equal the probability that I makes the price o er times the present value of the expected di erence in valuations, i.e. I (V H V L ) (the appendix provides more information on this). Hence, a high valuation buyer accepts with probability 1 a price o er that is lower than or equal tô
This separating price is higher than V L so that the low valuation buyer turns down the o er, but it is lower than V H so that the high valuation buyer is induced to accept the o er. The price that induces the high valuation buyer to reveal his information with probability 1 is an increasing function of both V L and V H . The higher V L , the lower the di erence V H V L , and the lower the expected rents that the high valuation buyer gives up by disclosing his valuation. This increases the rst period price that the incumbent manager can charge to induce the buyer to purchase the good with probability 1. The reason why the price increases in V H is that an increase in V H increases the bene t from purchasing the good in period 1 than it increases the rents that have to be o ered to the buyer to induce him to purchase the good in period 1.
If we distinguish between the high valuations in period 1 and in period 2, then the separating price increases in the rst period high valuation and decreases in the second period high valuation.
The separating price is a decreasing function of I , the incumbent manager's bargaining power in period 2. The higher I's bargaining power in period 2, the more likely I to make an o er in period 2, and the higher the high valuation buyer's expected bene t from mimicking a low valuation buyer. This makes it more costly for the incumbent manager to induce information revelation in period 1.
The buyer may also be tempted to adopt a mixed strategy if p 1 >p 1 .
In that case, the period 1 price is accepted with probability 1 x. When 1 increases, the probability that the high period 1 price is accepted increases as well. This increases the attractiveness of the semi-separating scenario to the rm. After deriving this semi-separating outcome and comparing the rm's expected payo resulting from this latter strategy from the former separating strategy, we obtain Proposition 1 : There exists^ 1 ( I ) 2 ( ; 1] such that the equilibrium is separating with p 1 = V H I (V H V L ) when 1 ^ 1 ( I ) and the equilibrium is semi-separating otherwise.^ 1 satis eŝ
Proof: See Appendix. 2
It appears that^ 1 ( I ) decreases in I . This can be explained as follows:
Bargaining power has several con icting e ects on the rm's payo . On the one hand, a high bargaining power gives the rm a high probability to make an o er p 1 and hence to appropriate a higher share of the surplus created. On the other hand, it leads the rm to decrease the rst period price in order to induce the high valuation buyer to reveal his information. In other words, it makes information revelation more costly. But when its ( rst period) bargaining power decreases, the rm is less likely to have the opportunity to induce the buyer to reveal his information. When the rst period o er is made by the buyer, the rm's o er in period 2 equals V H (as in the static case). Since the second e ect does not arise in the semi-separating scenario, an increase in I favors a semi-separating outcome rather than a fully separating one. Overall, the rm is still better o with a higher bargaining power, i.e. with a higher share of a lower payo .
Finally, when both V L and V H grow at the same rate from period 1 to period 2, the buyer's willingness to reveal information is higher. Growth emphasizes the bene t of period 2 transactions, and favors period 1 information disclosure. It is also immediate to check that the rm may now bene t from not having a bargaining power that is too high. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the \working atmosphere" is better in growth rms, as their stakeholders expect to bene t more from a higher expected surplus, while mature rms tend to cut costs, reduce their stakeholders' rents, and experience less communication among di erent parties.
The Impact of Takeovers on Information Flows
The decision to takeover the rm depends on the expected product market payo in period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the manager expects a pro t d maxf 2 V H ; V L g, with d 2 fI; Bg. Given the cost C associated with a takeover, B will takeover the rm if, and only if
Recall that the possible beliefs to the manager in period 2 are that the buyer's type is h with probability either 2 = 0 or 2 = : The rm's expected pro t then equals the low valuation; 2 = 1 : The expected pro t in period 2 is then I 1 V H if there is no takeover and b B 1 V H after a takeover. There is no takeover threat and the equilibrium on the product market is determined as in the previous section. If C < V L , the takeover takes place whatever the buyer's type and whatever the equilibrium in the product market. We restrict our analysis to the more interesting case where B's decision to takeover the rm depends on the equilibrium on the product market, i.e. V L C < V H . This implies that there is a takeover only if 2 = 1 and if 2 = 1. In this range, we may still want to distinguish between the cases V L C < 1 V H where the takeover takes place when 2 = 1 , i.e., after an o er from the buyer in period 1, and 1 V H C < V H , where the takeover only takes place when 2 = 1. It is easy to see that these two cases a ect information revelation similarly when the rm makes the rst period o er. Without loss of generality, we can restrict ourselves to the case:
Clearly, the period 2 strategies are similar to those of the previous subsection. The low valuation buyer's decisions on the product market are not modi ed compared to that of the previous subsection.
However, the high valuation buyer's response to an o er p 1 is modi ed.
This buyer expects that revealing his information will trigger a takeover. To make him reveal his type with probability 1, the price o ered by the rm in period 1 must now satisfy
Hence, we obtain Proposition 2 The price chosen by the rm in order to induce the buyer to reveal his valuation with probability 1 satis es
The separating price now increases with I and decreases with B . The intuition behind this is simple. Revealing information triggers a takeover, but not revealing information prevents the takeover. When the rm makes the price o er in period 2, the second period informational rent that the buyer obtains if he did not disclose information previously is I (V H V L ). On the other hand, the takeover increases the rent that the buyer obtains when he makes the period 2 price o er in period 2, but it decreases the probability that he will make such an o er.
The separating price equals the rst period valuation minus the overall expected rent that is a ected by the prospect of the takeover. It is higher
and lower thanp 1 ( I ) otherwise. The separating price is higher than that in the previous subsection if the buyer bene ts more from the increase in valuation after the takeover than he loses by having a low bargaining power. Overall, the buyer bene ts from revealing information if the takeover increases his valuation substantially. However, he loses if the bidder's higher bargaining power a ects the payo to the buyer more than the increase in valuation.
After analyzing the mixed strategy, we thus obtain: 
Proof: See Appendix. 2 . When b is high enough, the period 2 bene t of period 1 information disclosure is so high that the rm always wants to elicit information from the buyer.
This, or a su ciently low B , favors a separating equilibrium on the product market. 7 Not only the prospect of a takeover leads the manager to change its separating price when 1 <~ 1 ( I ; B ), but also it a ects the range where the manager chooses a semi-separating price.
Corollary 1~ 1 increases with I and in b, and it decreases with B .
The threshold~ 1 ( I ; B ) is higher than^ 1 ( I ) if b is high enough and if B is low enough. However, as b goes close to 1 and B becomes signi cantly higher than I , the separating price goes down, and the semi-separating equilibrium becomes more likely.
A takeover creates value by increasing the buyer's valuation, but it may also create value by leading to a separating equilibrium in cases where the equilibrium would have been semi-separating without the prospect of a takeover. On the other hand, the possibility of a takeover may be socially costly when it induces I to choose a semi-separating price while he would have chosen a separating in an environment without takeovers. Indeed, a semi-separating price leads the high valuation buyer to buy the good in period 1 only with some probability lower than 1 while he would have bought it with probability 1 with a separating price.
Corollary 2 A takeover can create value not only by increasing the buyer's valuation, but also by favoring a separating equilibrium when the increase in value is high enough. But when the increase in the buyer's valuation is small, the prospect of a takeover can reduce value by restricting the probability of a trade in period 1.
Finally, it should be noted that since the buyer appropriates a fraction 1 B of the increase in his valuation, some value-increasing takeovers do not take place. Indeed, a takeover creates value in period 2 if (b 1)
Hence, there may be a hold-up problem that is created by the buyer's rents and that will probibit value-creating takeovers.
Stochastic Bidder's Valuation and Imperfect Commitment
In this section, we discuss two alternatives to model the di erences between the incumbent manager and the bidder. Instead of a combination of a di erent valuation and di erent bargaining powers, the di erences between the incumbent manager and the bidder could arise from a (stochastic) bidder's valuation and from a model where I and B would arise as di erent abilities to stick to a full-commitment long-term contract.
A deterministic bidder's valuation and a take-it-or-leave-it price o er made by the rm to the buyer is a special case in our analysis ( I = B = 1). The takeover occurs only when the bidder's valuation is higher than the incumbent manager's. In this case, the takeover can only bene t the buyer through a lower separating price in period 1. There can be no takeover that hurts the buyer.
This need not be the case with a stochastic bidder's valuation and a takeit-or-leave-it o er from the period 2 manager. Speci cally, assume that the valuation is higher than v, or that b > 1, with probability , and that it is lower than v, or that b < 1, with probability 1 . The bidder's valuation is realised after the second period price o er is made, but before the buyer accepts or rejects this o er. Then an analysis similar to that in section 4
indicates that following a takeover the possible period 2 prices are E(b)V H and E(b)V L instead of bV H and bV L . Hence, the buyer accepts the price o er when b > 1, but he rejects it when b < 1, and then there is no trade despite the fact that the buyer's valuation is positive. As in section 4, the buyer can obtain a rent through a reduced period 1 separating price. In other words, the probability plays a role similar to the bargaining power in our model. The main di erence with our model is that unless the rm has the default option to sell the good at price V L to another buyer the stochastic valuation then creates an ine cency when the buyer's valuation is lower than the price charged by the bidder. With such a default option, however, the results are identical to ours.
The ability to commit to a long-term contract with some probability is another alternative way of interpreting our model that also leads to identical results. It is well-known that such a contract is generally not-renegotiationproof (La ont and Tirole, 1993), but the rm may have an imperfect ability to commit by making renegotiation di cult or costly.
In our model, a full-commitment contract leaves the buyer with no rent in period 2: Following the rejection of a period 1 price o er to the buyer, the rm does not update its beliefs and charges the same period 2 price as in the static case (Baron and Besanko, 1984) , that is a price equal to the high valuation.
When the rm cannot commit, we are back to our model with I = B = 1, i.e.
the cases where the rm makes take-it-or-leave it o ers to the buyer. Hence, the buyer can only appropriate a rent through the possibility that the rm will not be able to commit through a long term contract. Again, denoting I and B the probabilities that the incumbent manager and the bidder are unable to commit to the long term contract leads to results that are formally equivalent to ours. The theory of disciplinary takeovers states that managers, or more generally stakeholders, have to engage in value-creating actions in order to discourage a bidder from taking over the rm and taking this value-creating action. 9 One problem with the moral hazard model without asymmetric information that is often used (typically based on Grossman and Hart, 1980) , the stakeholders work hard to prevent a takeover, and the takeover takes place when the rm's poor performance is due to bad luck rather than low e ort. However, considering an adverse selection problem (potentially combined with a moral hazard problem) can lead to results where the low performance due to stakeholders' low type triggers a takeover.
Our results further suggest that the target rm's performance before the takeover may be a ected by the takeover threat. In our model, the expectation 8 In this second alternative again, the expected surplus created may be altered unless the rm is assumed to have the default option to sell the good to another buyer at price V L . Without such a default option, the surplus is not created if the buyer turns out to have a low valuation.
9 It should be noted that the disciplinary takeover argument may also be undermined by stakeholders' entrenchment. When stakeholders are entrenched, it may be costly for a bidder to engage in actions that will create more value than the incumbent manager. Takeover threats may precisely encourage the stakeholders to engage in some irreversible investment that make them entrenched. This may worsen the rm's performance instead of improving it.
of a wealth-transferring takeover reduces the stakeholders' willingness to reveal information, and it increases the cost of inducing information disclosure. On the other hand, when stakeholders expect to bene t from a takeover, they are less reluctant to disclose information. This suggests that an expected disciplinary takeover leads the rm to underperform, which may in turn prompt the takeover. However, the prospect of a takeover that is meant to create operating synergies may well lead the rm to perform better.
Existing tests on the performance of takeover targets (Agrawal and Ja e, 2003) generally do not distinguish between these hypotheses. They do not distinguish either the hypotheses that some targets may underperform because they are poorly managed or because takeover threats undermine the incentives within the organization. For this purpose, it would be interesting to test whether long-term takeover rumours (and potentially the nature of these rumours) tend to improve or to worsen the performance of potential target rms.
Our results lead to other predictions that cannot easily be derived through a model based on moral hazard only. In a model with asymmetric information, when the target rm's stakeholders expect a takeover to be followed by a strategy that leaves them with fewer rents, their outside options become more attractive. Hence, the threat of such a takeover may lead them to leave the target rm. This is consistent with the casual observation that some rms that are subject to takeover threats tend to experience substantial managerial turnover, and particularly the departure of some of their \best" managers to competing rms. The examples of Apple and a number of banks have been widely documented in the business press, but apart from Mikkelson and Partch who provide partial support for this we are not aware of any academic work on the e ect of takeover threats on managerial turnover.
Suppliers and Trade Credit
The literature on the real e ects of takeover threats has generally focused on workers and managers. This creates a di culty, because the employment relationship is subject to many contingencies that may interfere with tests on the real e ects of takeover activity. Tests on the e ect of takeovers on trade partners may well be less noisy. Arguably, it is di cult to track down input prices, but it should be possible to analyze the e ect of takeovers on supplier-buyer relationships through the stock price reaction of (closely) vertically related rms after the announcement of a takeover, and especially through trade credit.
Most theories of trade credit rely on asymmetric information models (Smith, 1986 , Lee and Stowe, 1993 , Petersen and Rajan, 1997 , Frank and Maksimovic, 1999 . In particular, they point out that trade credit a ects the rm's ability to price discriminate. Our paper is in line with this argument, and it further suggests that the prospect of a takeover may a ect the terms of trade credit. We are not aware of any empirical paper that tests the e ect of takeover activity on trade credit.
Most trade credit contracts are typically short-term contracts that o er a grace period at a very low, or even zero, interest rate (Frank and Maksimovic, 1999) . In our paper, trade credit at a low interest rate may be a way for rms to give away rents to the buyer in order to encourage him to disclose his valuation. Hence, a takeover that is expected to bene t (resp. hurt) the buyer may well lead to less (resp. more) favorable terms in the trade credit contract. This in turn decreases (resp. decreases) the attractiveness of trade credit compared to standard credit. We then predict that the possibility of such a takeover will decrease (resp. increase) the fraction of trade credit to nancing from nancial creditors.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the interactions between a takeover threat and the dynamics of pricing strategies and information ows both across and within organizations. We pointed out that takeovers may have real e ects even in the absence of any moral hazard problem. In particular, they may a ect the way information ows among stakeholders. In addition, asymmetric information may enhance the e ects of takeover threats on incentives.
A comparison between asymmetric information and moral hazard models can be drawn. The existing literature on the real e ects of takeovers (based on moral hazard) shares a number of features in common to the e ects that were developed in this paper. For instance, the argument that takeover threats prevent rms from entering implicit contracts (Shleifer and Summers, 1988, and Chemla, 2003a) relies on an e ect on stakeholders' incentives to invest in a way that is parallel to the stakeholder's incentive to disclose information in our model. Similarly, it is possible to derive results close in spirit to the disciplinary takeover argument (Grossman and Hart, 1980, and Scharfstein, 1988) , whereby a takeover threat induces stakeholders to reveal information.
As in moral hazard models, though, this would require a speci cation where not disclosing information increases the payo to the bidder.
Apart from relying on di erent mechanisms than moral hazard models, an asymmetric information framework may be more appropriate for seller/buyer relationships. Such relationships may well be more appropriate to test real effects of takeover threats than relationships between shareholders, managers and workers, mostly because labor contracts may include many contingencies that are widely independent of takeover activity. Asymmetric information models can help derive a number of empirical predictions that cannot be easily derived from moral hazard models and that can be tested on vertical relationships. For instance, takeovers may a ect the dynamics of pricing strategies, trade credit, and stakeholder turnover.
the o er and 2 = 0 if he rejects it, i.e. the equilibrium is fully separating.
Hence, p 2 ( 2 (x 1 = 1)) = V H and p 2 ( 2 (x 1 = 0)) = V L . Since w 2 = 0 in all cases, the separating price o ered by the rm in period 1 equalŝ
Let now consider the case where the rm o ers a price higher thanp 1 . In this case, only semi-separating equilibria where the high valuation buyer randomizes may exist. In equilibrium, the high valuation buyer must be indi erent between accepting and rejecting an o er p 1 . If we denote 2 = P robfp 2 = V L g,
10 Such an equilibrium also requires that the rm be indi erent between choosing p 2 = V L and p 2 = V H . 11 Hence, the probability x that a high valuation buyer accepts to buy at price p 1 in period 1 must satisfy 2 V H = V L , with 2 following the Bayes' rule
which implies that 1 x = ( 1 )=(1 ). If the high valuation buyer rejects the o er, the expected payo to the rm in period 2 is I [ 2 V L +(1 2 ) V H ] = I V L . Since this pro t does not depend on the o ered price, which in turn does not a ect x, the rm makes the highest rst period o er that the high valuation buyer may accept, i.e. p 1 = V H . This price corresponds to 2 = 0.
12
10 If the LHS were higher than the RHS, the high valuation buyer would choose to reject the o er p 1 . Hence, no information would be revealed and the rm would choose p 2 = V H with probability 1, which would drive the RHS to 0. This result would be consistent for no p 1 V H . If the RHS were strictly higher than the LHS, the high valuation buyer would choose to accept the o er with probability 1, which would induce the rm to choose p 2 = V L with probability 1. This result is incompatible with the assumption that p 1 >p 1 .
11 If p 2 = V H with probability 1, then for all p 1 < V H the buyer is strictly better o revealing his private information in period 1. If p 2 = V L with probability 1, then (since p 1 p 1 ) the buyer would be better o not revealing his information in period 1.
12 In other words, since the rm leaves the buyer with no rent in period 1, the fact that the buyer must be indi erent requires that it does not leave him any rent in period 2 either.
Hence, the pooling, separating and semi-separating payo s to the rm can be written s 0
ss 0
where superscripts s and ss mean separating and semi-separating, respectively.
Since 1 > V L =V H , the pooling payo that the rm would obtain if it did not try to learn the type of the buyer in period 1,
comparison of the separating and the semi-separating utilities yields the result.
2
Proof of Proposition 3:
If the buyer plays a mixed strategy, the rm's expected pro t in period 2 is, as in the preceding subsection, equal to V L . The pooling, separating and semi-separating payo s to the rm satisfy 
As before, the pooling payo is dominated by the separating payo . The separating payo is higher than the semi separating one if, and only if,
The derivatives with respect to I ; B , and b can be written
